

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 SP-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
PM-05 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01
EUR-12 NEA-10 ARA-10 ACDA-12 HA-05 /106 W
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O R 120732Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7792
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KHARTOUM 3091

DEPT PASS OTHER INTERESTED POSTS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: XA, MARR, PORG
SUBJ: PRE-OAU SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT NIMEIRI

REF: STATE 171696

1. I SPENT AN HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT NIMEIRI ON JULY 11, THE LONGEST HEAD-TO-HEAD CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE. I OPENED BY REVIEWING POINTS SET FORTH IN REFTEL IN DETAIL. NIMEIRI'S FIRST REMARK WAS TO SAY THAT HE LIKED THE MESSAGE VERY MUCH, AS IT CONTAINED A LOT OF POSITIVE POINTS. THROUGHOUT MY PRESENTATION, HE NODDED HIS HEAD IN AGREEMENT AT VARIOUS TIMES.

2. ANGOLA-ZAIRE. NIMEIRI SAID U.S. STRATEGY IN THIS DISPUTE COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH SUDANESE POLICY. WAR WOULD NOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. ANGOLA AND ZAIRE WERE TWO OF THE LARGEST COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND STABILITY IN BOTH WAS NEEDED BY ALL AFRICANS. HE LIKED THE IDEA OF RECIPROCAL STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS. HE SAID ONE OF PROBLEMS WAS THAT ANGOLANS BELIEVED MOBUTO COVETED CABINDA. HE WAS GOING TO GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO

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SUGGESTION OF LIBERIAN PRESIDENT TOLBERT AS MEDIATOR. TOLBERT HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB AS MEDIATOR AMONG THE FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, TOLBERT WOULD SUCCEED NIMEIRI AS OAU CHAIRMAN. NIMEIRI WENT ON TO STATE, THAT IN LINE WITH HIS OPENING SPEECH, SUDAN WAS GOING TO PROPOSE THAT A STANDING COMMITTEE OF OAU VICE PRESIDENTS BE SET UP TO WORK, BETWEEN

SUMMITS, SOMEWHAT ALONG THE LINES OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. TOLBERT WOULD BE ONE OF THOSE VICE PRESIDENTS.

3. NAMIBIA. NIMEIRI SAID THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE. ALL THE AFRICAN MINISTERS HE HAD THUS FAR MET HAD SAID THEY HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S GOOD FAITH. THEY SAY THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS BY ARMS. THE SUDAN WAS TRYING TO PREVENT THIS. A RESORT TO ARMS WOULD PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WOULD DOUBTLESS GET INTO IT, AND THEN THE WEST MIGHT HAVE TO INTERVENE. MOREOVER, BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, SOUTH AFRICA WAS A GREAT POWER. A WAR IN NAMIBIA WOULD BE A REAL WAR, NOT GUERRILLA SKIRMISHING AS IN RHODESIA. SUDAN BELIEVED THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP WAS A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND HOPED THE LUANDA MEETING WOULD SUCCEED. IT WOULD HELP IF SOUTH AFRICA STARTED SOME TROOP WITHDRAWALS. NIMEIRI SAID HE COUNTED ON USG HELP IN DETERRING THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THEY WERE ABOUT TO INTERVENE.

4. RHODESIA. NIMEIRI OPENED THIS PORTION OF CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT SUDANGOV HAD REFUSED TO ADMIT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ZIMBABWE LEADERS WHO WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID SUDAN WAS NOT AGAINST THEM, BUT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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MILITATED AGAINST THE ADMISSION OF GROUPS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU. SUDAN HAD ALSO EXCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF POLISARIO, AND CANARY ISLANDS FOR SAME REASON. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, SAID NIMEIRI, THINKS IT CAN WIN MILITARILY, BUT HE AGREED WITH USG THAT IT WOULD DESTROY THE COUNTRY. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED THE TALKING PAPER MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE AND I HAD SUBMITTED. SUDAN WAS TALKING TO THE FRONT LINE STATES, URGING THEM NOT TO ESCALATE THE GUERRILLA WAR. THIS WAS AGAINST THEIR OWN INTERESTS. SUDAN FELT US-UK PROPOSALS WERE A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. NIMEIRI REITERATED SUSPICIONS VOICED BY FRANCIS DENG TO DAS DALLEY AND MS. HOLLOWAY THAT BRITISH WERE NOT TRYING AS HARD AS THEY COULD.

5. AFRICAN PEACE FORCE. NIMEIRI NOTED THAT IN HIS OPENING SPEECH, HE HAD NOT RECOMMENDED A PEACE FORCE. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT OAU DISCUSS AN AFRICAN MODALITY TO DETER ARMED CLASHES. SUDAN WAS GOING TO PROPOSE THAT A PLANNING OFFICE BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE OAU. THAT OFFICE WOULD, WHEN NECESSARY, CALL ON INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO SUPPLY LIMITED NUMBERS OF TROOPS. SUCH TROOPS WOULD SERVE AS A SYMBOL OF AFRICAN DETERMINATION

AGAINST HOSTILITIES RATHER THAN A MILITARY DETERRENT. THIS PLANNING OFFICE WOULD, IN CASE OF NEED, ELICIT ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, ASK THE USG FOR TRANSPORT OR SUPPLIES. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD ALREADY CHANGED BASIC MISSION DOCUMENT OF SUDAN ARMED FORCES TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION IN MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE UN, THE OAU, AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KHARTOUM 3091

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6. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. NIMEIRI SAID OAU WOULD PROBABLY PASS ANOTHER RESOLUTION DECRYING FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. TROUBLE WAS THAT MODERATES BELIEVED THIS INCLUDED SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION. "PROGRESSIVES" DID NOT. SUDAN HOPED FOR US SUPPORT IN MOBILIZING AFRICAN AND WORLD OPINION AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE. SUDAN FIGURED THAT THERE WERE 50,000 SOVIETS/CUBANS IN 13 AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THEIR TECHNICIANS WERE ALL RIGHT, BUT NOT THEIR MILITARY.

7. CHAD. NIMEIRI PLACED ENTIRE BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN OF TRIPOLI CONFERENCE STRICTLY ON THE SHOULDERS OF CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER. THE MEDIATION HAD BEEN GOING WELL, AND THEY WERE ON THE VERGE OF AGREEMENT. SUDANESE WERE THEN ASTONISHED THAT CHAD FOMIN REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT ANYTHING OR DISCUSS THE PEACE PLAN. SUDANESE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT THERE COULD BE NO DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH UNTIL THE REBELS LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS AND ACCEPTED A CEASE-FIRE TO BE POLICED BY, INTER ALIA, SUDAN. NIMEIRI SAID THAT SUDAN WAS GOING SLOWLY BUT SURELY TO DIMINISH LIBYAN

INTERFERENCE IN CHAD. LIBYANS HAD STARTED TO UNDERSTAND
THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION. THE CHADIANS NOW SEEMED
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TO WANT TO FIGHT. NIMEIRI SAID HE PLANNED TO TALK TO
MALLOUM NEXT WEEK. HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO QADDAFI
ALSO, BUT BELIEVED THAT LATTER WAS "AFRAID" TO COME TO
KHARTOUM. NIMEIRI SAID HE BELIEVED MENGISTU MIGHT ALSO
FINESSE ATTENDANCE AT THE SUMMIT.

8. ERITREA AND CUBANS. NIMEIRI SAID THE ETHIOPIANS
WERE PUSHING THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS TO ENTER THE
BATTLE IN ERITREA. CUBANS AND SOVIETS HAD SAID PUBLICLY
THAT THEY WOULD NOT, BUT BOTH WERE MILITARILY PRESENT IN
ERITREA. NIMEIRI SAID HE BELIEVED REASON THEY WERE NOT
ATTACKING WAS THAT THERE WERE NO SUITABLE TARGETS AS YET
IN WHAT WAS STILL A GUERRILLA WAR. NIMEIRI THEN ASKED
FOR USG TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ITS AFRICAN FRIENDS TO
BUILD SUPPORT FOR AN OAU RESOLUTION URGING THAT CUBA
BE EXPELLED FROM THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. CUBA,
SAID NIMEIRI, WAS PROBABLY THE MOST ACTIVE MEMBER OF
THE WARSAW PACT. A COLLECTIVE OAU RESOLUTION IN
KHARTOUM WOULD BE HELPFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN BELGRADE.

9. OAU ORGANIZATION. NIMEIRI SAID SUDAN WOULD AGAIN
SUPPORT RESOLUTION THAT OAU HQ BE MOVED OUT OF
ADDIS ABABA. SUDAN HAD PROPOSED THIS LAST YEAR AT
LIBREVILLE, BUT HAD BEEN HAMPERED BECAUSE IT COULD
NOT PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE SITE. NOW TWO COUNTRIES,
TOGO AND LIBERIA, HAD COME FORWARD WITH OFFERS TO HOST THE
OAU HQ. SUDAN WOULD, HOWEVER, GET ANOTHER COUNTRY
TO SPONSOR THE PROPOSAL. OTHERWISE ETHIOPIANS WOULD THINK
THAT SUDAN WAS ACTING FOR ANTI-ETHIOPIAN REASONS. SUDAN'S
REAL CONCERN WAS SECURITY FOR OAU HQ. SUDAN WOULD VOTE TO
REPLACE ETEKI AS OAU SECRETARY GENERAL. SUDAN HAD NOT
YET DECIDED WHETHER TO VOTE FOR CANDIDATE FROM ZAMBIA,
ZAIRE, TO TOGO, BUT THEY WOULD VOTE AGAINST ETEKI. SUDAN
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ALSO WANTED TO CHANGE THE SECRETARIAT. THEY WANTED TO PUT
A SUDANESE INTO A POSITION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY GENERAL SO THAT HE COULD ASSIST NIMEIRI DURING
HIS YEAR AS CHAIRMAN. NIMEIRI SAID HE HAD SUDAN'S
PRESENT AMBASSADORS TO JORDAN OR TO SWEDEN IN MIND
FOR THIS JOB.

10. SOMALIA. NIMEIRI HAD SEEN SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTER JUST BEFORE RECEIVING ME. HE SAID FONMIN HAD REPORTED THAT SOVIETS, CUBANS, ETHIOPIANS, AND SOUTH YEMENIS WERE REQUISITIONING CATTLE AND FOOD FROM OGADEN INHABITANTS. FONMIN ALSO SAID THAT WSLF HAD TAKEN SOVIET AND CUBAN PRISONERS. ETHIOPIANS WERE BOMBARDING SOMALI VILLAGES IN RETALIATION FOR THIS. I SAID THAT AS FAR AS USG RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA WERE CONCERNED, WE WERE STILL FACING THE PROBLEM WE HAD DISCUSSED DURING THE VISIT OF DAS HARROP AND HORMATS. SIAD BARRE SAID HE HAD STOPPED ALL ASSISTANCE TO WSLF BUT THERE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED SURPRISE SAYING THAT SOMALI FONMIN HAD JUST ASSURED HIM THAT WSLF WAS ACTING COMPLETELY ON ITS OWN, HAVING AMASSED A CONSIDERABLE STOCK OF WEAPONS ("MORE THAN THE INVENTORY OF THE SOMALI REGULAR ARMY") AND HAVING BEEN WELL TRAINED DURING THE MAJOR OPERATIONS IN OGADEN. NIMEIRI SAID THAT IF USG WANTED TO GIVE HIM SOME EVIDENCE OF SAID BARRE'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR WSLF, HE WOULD FACE SIAD BARRE WITH IT WHEN HE SEES HIM NEXT WEEK.

11. COMMENT: IF FOREGOING IS ANY INDICATION, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE A COMFORTABLE YEAR WITH NIMEIRI AS OAU CHAIRMAN. MOREOVER, WHILE FOR TACTICAL REASONS, NIMEIRI HAS MUTED HIS PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS, FEAR OF THEM IS STILL A BASIC DETERMINANT OF HIS AFRICAN POLICY. BERGUS

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